I realize some of my opinions may encourage the thought I am a burned-out hippie conspiracy theory type, functionally lobotomized by an acid induced hallucination of a bullet wheezing past my ear from the grassy knoll. Enough already with the Vietnam allusions and pointless skepticism about 9/11, let move on. Decision on Afghanistan is complicated enough without peering through the yet unfocused prism of history, you may say. But, we can't ignore the past. The light of revelation is wired in series. If Lewis and Clark didn't know their point of origin they wouldn't have been explorers, they would have been lost. It is sometimes necessary to disassemble history to understand how the small parts, serendipity, mistakes, hubris, good intentions, and venality combine into a motive force that can be steered in any direction according to the narrative you choose to accept. For example, the shade tree Barton W. Mitchell chose to rest under could arguably be as essential to our present national reality as Newton's apple tree was to modern science. One almost invisible strand of spider silk is sometimes the tie that binds. When I suggest that oil and natural gas may have played a substantial, maybe dominant part in the formulations of those crafting an outline for 21st century American geo-political strategy, I am not sublimating the energy realities of modern societies, and I am not too obtuse to recognize the effect of $4.00 a gallon gasoline played in the political regime change of the last election. I can also understand the allure of the pipe dream of perpetual preeminence that lay in attempting to selfishly and strategically deny any other influence over these resources equal to or greater than our own. And I admit it was unfair to caricature those implementing our military conquest of the oil and gas regions as inherently evil, moustache twirling, Snidley Whiplash's of American Exceptionalism. But I think it is worthwhile to ascertain, due to their close proximity, if their best civic fiduciary judgment wasn't compromised by long term exposure to the radiation and riches of Dwight Eisenhower's feared Military/Industrial Complex; in the same way the recent bank bail-outs can and should be scrutinized taking into account Robert Rubin’s, Hank Paulsen’s, Larry Summers’, and Timothy Geithner’s intellectual and material conditioning on Wall Street.

Is interjecting the Military/Industrial Complex into our Afghan dilemma another paranoid delusion? It seems to me all the elements to bring this into consideration are in place. We have oil, natural gas, private armies, and huge defense contractors with documented intimate relationships and professional ties to decision makers; all of which titillate the profit motive. And it is difficult to believe, if pure military science is separated from the industrial complex, that you would find many rational, experienced, professional generals who would countenance or recommend a conventional invasion of Afghanistan considering the size and terrain of the theater of operation, that nation's history, demography, and tribal structure, the cultural and religious xenophobia of the populace, the antagonistic neighboring nations, the lack of recognized central authority, and the nature and structure of the enemy and his ability to blend into the general population, if the object was less than total war and total victory, in response to a credible threat to our national security. But since we have been tilting at wind mills for eight years, it can't be too far-out to speculate that only something very insidious and powerful could have overcome the Pentagon's institutional memory and hard learned lessons of Vietnam. I suggest it may be the same something that will seduce, or compel, escalation in Afghanistan. And its impetus may be nearly as great as the reputed menace of Al Qaeda. The Military/Industrial Complex may be so entrenched our civilian leaders may no longer be able to or courageous or ethically innocent enough to, differentiate even one degree of separation of our national character and interests from their corporate interests. And that inability may be the etiology of still another politico-military quagmire, resulting from trying to serve two masters. If after eight years of engagement we’re still trying to define the mission and its end game, many “delusional” questions should be asked. I, for one, wonder how history (and Eisenhower’s ghost) will audit our serial investments in sub-prime wars.